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1. lntrodluction 
Hubert Dreyfus claims that traditional AI research is a degenerating research 
programme in the sense developed by Imre Lakatos. Using the computerized 
chess system Deep Thought as an example, we argue that AI research is actually a 
progressive programme, reaching expert levels of performance using techniques 
of deep heuristic search that Dreyfus has characterized as hopeless. On the other 
hand, Dreyfus can offer no plausible, concrete alternatives for implementing the 
holistic processes that he thinks underlie cognition. Non-symbolic devices, such as 
holograms and connectionist networks, are shown to be unsuitable for his 
purposes. Although current opinion about Dreyfus in the AI community is mixed, 
given the success of symbolic AI in areas where Dreyfus predicted failure, his 
long-term influence on the field will probably be minimal. 
This is not to suggest hat all the important questions regarding symbol-based 
approaches to AI have been settled. There is ongoing, vigorous debate in this 
area, much of it quite independent of Dreyfus. We argue merely that, given the 
rather fundamental objections Dreyfus has to symbol-based AI, its success in 
particula:r areas where he predicted failure is a serious challenge to his position. 
In the re-issuance of his notorious book What Computers Still Can’t Do, Hubert 
Dreyfus offers not so much a continuation of his attack on artificial intelligence 
research as a eulogy presented over AI’s grave. In yet another appended 
introduction (there are now three printed serially in this edition), he invokes “a 
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view of a bygone period of history”, and characterizes “Good Old Fashioned AI” 
(the phrase is Haugeland’s) as a degenerating research programme, in the sense 
developed by Imre Lakatos [p. ix] and [12]. According to Dreyfus, researchers 
are abandoning the field in droves, and funding is evaporating as AI finds itself 
increasingly incapable of realizing its research goals. 
Our assessment of the state of artificial intelligence research is not as dire as 
Dreyfus’. Indeed, we are guardedly optimistic about the field’s long-term 
prospects. Certainly, artificial intelligence research has its share of problems 
(perhaps even more than its share), against which Dreyfus lays a barrage of 
criticisms. However, unlike Dreyfus, we do not see these problems as represent- 
ing fundamental imitations to AI, at least regarding cognitive performance. (We 
leave aside even thornier issues such as whether computers can exhibit self- 
consciousness or emotive capacities.) More particularly, and more importantly, 
we do not see AI as a degenerating research programme in the sense developed 
by Lakatos. 
We think it is worthwhile meeting Dreyfus on grounds of his own choosing in 
order to assess the state of AI research, and Lakatos’ methodology makes a useful 
context for the comparisons we draw in our argument. In broad sweep, after we 
briefly describe Lakatos’ methodology of research programmes, we will compare 
two different AI research approaches involving machine chess-one of which 
Dreyfus should find fairly sympathetic to his own views, the other of which he 
roundly criticizes. Our conclusion is that, in general, the approach favored by 
Dreyfus actually fares less well (is less progressive) than the one he criticizes. 
2. Lakatos: the methodology of research programmes 
One way of viewing Lakatos’ methodology is as a reaction against Karl 
Popper’s falsificationism [13] and a compromise with Thomas Kuhn’s doctrine of 
scientific revolutions [ll]. Although these views are fairly familiar, it is worth 
rehearsing them briefly here. Popper argues for a strict falsificationism in which, 
given that we cannot conclusively confirm a general scientific theory, the best 
strategy is to attempt vigorously to disconfirm theories by subjecting them to a 
series of critical experiments. The task of science is essentially negative, and our 
claims to knowledge are radically contingent, being limited to those theories not 
yet eliminated. Kuhn, on the other hand, argues that scientific research is 
mediated by “paradigms”, concrete examples of scientific success that implicitly 
provide research strategies and methodologies. On this view, the task of science is 
not to ruthlessly eliminate theories, but to apply them in progressively wider 
domains. Paradigms go unchallenged until increasingly pervasive failures precipi- 
tate a scientific crisis, causing the collapse of an old paradigm and the rise of a 
new paradigm. However, because a shift of paradigms requires a radical gestalt 
shift in the way scientists view the world, paradigms are incommensurable and 
cannot be rationally evaluated relative to one another. 
In contrast, Imre Lakatos develops a methodology of research programmes 
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[12]. In his view, what are evaluated in science are not individual theories or 
paradigms, but historically developing series of closely-related theories dubbed 
“research programmes”. Research programmes are identified by a “hard core” of 
centrally-important hypotheses that are relatively insulated from criticism (similar 
to Kuhn’s paradigms); modifications are generally limited to a “protective belt” of 
ancillary hypotheses [12, p. 41. A “positive heuristic” associated with the 
programme incorporates strategies for dealing with anomalies and generating 
novel app!lications of the hard core. 
Contrary to Popper, Lakatos argues that there is no “instant rationality” 
whereby a theory may be eliminated by a single critical experiment [12, p. 61. 
Rather, competing research programmes must be evaluated relative to one 
another over a protracted period. As Lakatos says, “. . . there is no refutation 
without a better theory” [12, p. 61. Further, contrary to Kuhn, there is not a 
single crisis-punctuated series of paradigms, but rather multiple simultaneously- 
competing research programmes, some of which gradually win out over others. 
Research programmes are evaluated according to whether they are degenerat- 
ing or progressive. Degenerating programmes essentially are those that predict no 
new facts:, but rather engage only in ad hoc modifications. An example of a 
degenerating programme was the Ptolemaic system of planetary motion. Al- 
though an increasingly elaborate series of epicycles was able to accommodate new 
facts of pl,anetary motion, the telling point for Lakatos is that such modifications 
came only after the fact. No new facts or predictions of planetary motion were 
forthcoming from the research programme itself. 
On the other hand, progressive programmes predict new, unexpected facts. For 
instance, not only did general relativity theory explain, in a way superior to its 
rivals, previously-known facts such as the precession of the orbit of Mercury-it 
also predilcted unexpected facts like the bending of light in a gravitational field 
]12, P. 51. 
Our purpose in this paper, then, is to compare the performance of rival 
research programmes over time, in the manner suggested by Lakatos. Although 
Dreyfus himself is not an AI researcher, there has been a fair amount of research 
done that is at least compatible with many of his essential views-enough to 
construct ;an outline of a research programme. For reasons that we will explain, 
the basis we have chosen for comparison is computer chess. We argue that on the 
basis of performance and implementation, particularly in comparison to 
“Dreyfus’ ” alternative programme, traditional AI is not degenerating. 
3. Chess: programs for a progressive programme 
In What Computers Still Can’t Do, Dreyfus presents a picture of traditional AI 
research that is virtually stagnant. However, while it is true that progress has not 
been as dramatic as predicted by early enthusiasts of AI, there has been steady 
progress. 13y any objective measure, in virtually every major field of investigation 
(such as ordinary language comprehension, visual perception, game playing, 
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machine learning), programs now perform better than they did when the book 
first appeared. Merely by dint of faster machines with larger memories, and more 
efficient programming languages, we would expect at least marginal progress-but 
there have also been important conceptual advances. 
However, because we cannot canvas the entire range of AI research here, we 
have chosen one signal area for consideration-computer chess. We have chosen 
it for a number of reasons. First, it is an area in which research alternatives at 
least compatible with many of Dreyfus’ views have been given serious considera- 
tion. Many researchers have been engaged in attempting to make computers play 
chess “the way people do”. Second, alternative research approaches in computer 
chess are fairly easily distinguishable. Even when combined in a single program, 
the differences between, for instance, knowledge-based or heuristic search 
approaches are evident. Third, progress in computer chess can be straight- 
forwardly gauged. Programs can play against one another and against human 
opponents to obtain a chess rating. Overall progress of one approach compared 
with another is determined simply by the rating of the best program at any one 
time. Finally, computer chess is an area that receives considerable attention from 
Dreyfus. 
3.1. Heuristic search: problems and prospects 
At this time, the best computer chess player is Deep Thought, a machine that 
plays chess at the grandmaster level, but in a way quite unlike that of human 
beings [lo]. If this seems surprising to Dreyfus, no doubt it is also surprising to 
others who, writing at about the time of the publication of the earlier, revised 
edition of What Computers Can’t Do, expressed opinions similar to his. For 
instance, in 1977, Neil Charness, echoing Henry Higgins, asked, “Why can’t a 
computer be more like a man?“, arguing that the best hope for expert computer 
play lay in designing programs that closely emulated human methods of play [l]. 
At the time, this seemed like a reasonable position. Programs based on 
heuristic search seemed to be running into a fundamental barrier, namely, the 
familiar problem of combinatorial explosion. The deepening searches of these 
programs quickly reached a point of diminishing returns in which the advantages 
of increasing look-ahead were negated by the increasing amount of time required 
to generate and evaluate the expanding branches of a search tree. Given the 
overwhelming size of the total space to be searched, dramatic increases in the 
proportion of possible moves that could be considered seemed unlikely. Even 
worse, those modest increases in search efficiency that could be achieved seemed 
to make little difference in performance. As Charness said of the programs of the 
time, “Adding a few plies [to the search] did not produce tremendous changes in 
performance” [ 1, pp. 36-371. 
For Dreyfus, the problems encountered in trying to program computers to play 
chess were not only expected, but, indeed, exemplified the fundamental imita- 
tions of machine intelligence he already suspected. These limitations seemed 
particularly clear to him when the heuristic search methods of computers were 
contrasted with the way human beings play chess. 
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3.2. HumIan play: patterns and perspicuous grouping 
Some early workers in human chess research believed that the overall level of 
human play also depended upon depth of search and memory. The chess master 
was envisioned as a sort of human calculating machine, considering many more 
combinations to much greater depths than those of novices. The astonishing truth, 
discovered by de Groot, was that chess masters and novices considered roughly 
the same :number of combinations, extended to about the same depth of search 
[l]. The primary difference was that chess masters considered the more important 
combinations. 
This capacity seemed to rest on the ability of the chess master to see the board 
in terms of meaningful patterns that had been encountered in previous games. For 
instance, when de Groot asked masters and novices to reconstruct board positions 
from memory, chess masters performed considerably better than novices when 
the positions were like those that might be encountered in actual games. 
However, masters and novices performed about equally well when the positions 
were essentially random. Furthermore, errors made by masters tended to be 
systematic, preserving important relationships among pieces, as when a pinned 
and pinning piece might both be displaced in the same direction along a single file 
so that the first piece remained pinned. 
Herbert Simon argued that the patterns recognized by chess masters were 
composed of “chunks” that represented meaningful relationships among groups 
of pieces such as castlings, pawn structures, pinned and protected pieces, etc. If 
short-term memory capacity is about seven meaningful items, and if each chess 
chunk incorporates about three or four pieces, then the chess master can 
recognize #and remember 21 positions while the novice can remember only seven. 
Simon also concluded that an expert chess player would need to be familiar with 
about 50,000 different patterns. Expert players become familiar with these 
patterns tlhrough many years of experience and practice. Furthermore, these 
patterns are apparently directly associated with remembered strategies and 
patterns o:E play that have proven successful in the past. 
These riesults are sympathetic with Dreyfus’ own analysis. For instance, he 
argues that when human chess adepts play the game, they do not examine every 
piece and every possible variation of moves. Rather, they focus initially on certain 
regions of the board, and only within those constraints examine specific pieces 
and possible moves. Pieces are not perceived as being disparately scattered about 
the board, but organized into “lines of force” and “areas of threat”. This human 
ability to “zero in” on significant regions-which Dreyfus calls “perspicuous 
grouping”--allows human players to escape the combinatorial explosion that 
overwhehns the explicit “counting out” that he claims is the only approach open 
to formal Icomputer systems. 
3.3. Deep Thought: the heuristic search response 
Given the difficulties involved in heuristic search, how does Deep Thought 
accomplish the level of play that it does? The answer is by pushing the depth of 
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search farther than has been done before. Deep Thought does this through a 
combination of faster hardware and a search strategy called singular extension. 
Deep Thought’s basic hardware contains 250 dedicated processor chips that 
allow it to search 500,000 positions per second. However, the program’s strength 
also lies in a search strategy that its developers call “singular extension”. 
Roughly, this strategy causes the program to search an extra ply in any situation 
where the program sees only a single good reply-that is, where moves are 
forced. 
What is particularly interesting is that a sufficiently deep search is able to 
compensate for the relatively small amount of chess knowledge incorporated in 
Deep Thought. This indicates that, to a significant extent, Deep Thought has 
been able to overcome the problem known as the “horizon effect”. 
The horizon effect arises (and derives its name) from the fact that a computer 
program using heuristic search is literally blind to anything beyond the terminal 
nodes of the search, which can sometimes lead to catastrophically bad play. As an 
extreme case, a search that extended to more than a couple of plies would be 
unable to avoid even the simplest traps or develop anything but the most 
rudimentary lines of play. However, similar fiascos can also arise during more 
extensive searches, for instance, if the search is terminated in the middle of a 
piece exchange, causing the program to sacrifice pieces to no advantage. This is 
why most programs incorporate an evaluation of a position’s “quiescence”. 
Search is allowed to terminate only on relatively “stable” positions and is 
extended further in positions involving such dynamic situations as ongoing piece 
exchanges. 
However, the quiescence of a chess position is often difficult to evaluate, 
leaving chess programs with peculiar lacunae in their play that can be exploited by 
human players. These shortcomings are what prompted Charness’ comment, 
quoted above, that adding a ply or two to the search of earlier programs did not 
affect their level of play very much, because the horizon effect still fell prey to the 
foresight of human players. 
A search of moderate depth can push back the horizon effect enough to avoid 
at least some of the more obvious blunders. However, with Deep Thought, the 
horizon seems to have been pushed back far enough to avoid even some of the 
fundamental shortcomings of previous programs. In a nutshell, the advantage 
Deep Thought has over its predecessors is its ability to see more clearly the 
consequences of its and its opponent’s moves. 
3.4. Evaluating the programme: from degenerating to progressive 
Deep Thought is clearly a vindication for the traditional AI programme of 
heuristic search. However, the evaluation of this approach during its interim 
period was understandably grim. The refrain that “just one or two more ply” 
would relieve the systematic deficits revealed in search programs by their human 
opponents must have sounded like the special pleadings of a degenerating 
programme trying to rationalize its failures. As Charniak and McDermott said in 
1985, 
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. . . it is tempting to say that sheer speed will no longer suffice, and that more 
knowledge of chess, or something else, is needed. But, in fact, nobody 
knows. Perhaps looking ahead another ply or two will do the job [2, p. 2931. 
In fact, looking ahead another ply or two does the job in a surprisingly regular 
way. It turns out that starting with the computer program Belle, which looks 
ahead about 5 plies and has a rating of about 1550, adding another ply of search 
adds abou.t 200 points to a program’s rating. Fig. 1 illustrates this virtually linear 
relationship. Deep Thought, at about 10 plies, has a rating between 2600 and 
2700. Relatively straightforward improvements in the system, anticipated by Hsu 
et al. [lOI, should increase its look ahead to 14 or 15 plies. If the above 
relationship holds, these improvements will put it beyond world champion 
Kasparov’s rating of about 2900. 
Naturally, no one knows whether this approximate relationship will continue to 
hold. Most of this uncertainty stems from our lack of understanding of what 
precisely underlies increasing human chess skill. As Daniel Crevier discusses in a 
related context, a difference in rating of 200 indicates that the higher-rated player 
will win 75% of the time against the lower-rated player [3, p. 2281. However, 
what exactly accounts for this increased skill? For instance, we know that human 
chess experts are familiar with more chess patterns than are novices, but the 
precise relationship between rating and number of familiar patterns is unknown. 
The relationship might turn out to be radically nonlinear, so that the difficulty of 
passing from Deep Thought’s current rating to that of Kasparov is much more 
difficult than the territory so far traversed by computers. Although the six data 
points pravided by early Belle through Deep Thought make this seem unlikely, 
only the future will tell precisely. However, what does seem fairly clear is that the 
strategy of increasingly deep heuristic search will continue to yield improved chess 
play. 
Belle Belle Belle Belle HiTech Deep Thought 
Fig. 1. Depth of search versus ratings (see [lo]). 
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3.5. The emulationist programme 
Attempts to design computers to play chess in a way similar to how human 
beings play chess-the emulationist programme-have not been neglected. For 
example, in a 1973 Scientific American article, Albert Zobrist and Frederic 
Carson Jr describe a computer program that uses generalized “snapshots” of 
chess situations to guide its selection of moves [16]. The authors of the program 
say they explicitly intended these snapshots to correspond to the “chunks” 
described by Simon. 
More recently, David Wilkins has written a program called PARADISE that 
incorporates about 200 production rules, representing various kinds of chess 
knowledge, to guide a relatively modest search [14]. However, PARADISE does 
not play chess at nearly the level of Deep Thought. 
3.6. Comparing programmes 
We do not think that the relative lack of success of the emulationist programme 
indicates any fundamental imitations of the programme, and there is no reason to 
think that further research will not yield progress. However, there are some 
underlying factors, mostly involving hardware advances and implementations, 
that help account for the progress in the search programme. 
Recall that, according to Lakatos, every research programme has an associated 
positive heuristic that is supposed to provide strategies for dealing with anomalies 
and extending the applications of the hard core. If we take the essential 
hypothesimr hard core-of the search programme to be that a sufficiently deep 
search can compensate for lack of knowledge, then the essential strategy of the 
positive heuristic is straightforwardly to search for methods that extend the depth 
of search. This is fortunate in two ways. First, the fundamentals of search are 
well-understood, including strategies for efficiently pruning large search trees, 
such as alpha-beta searching. The development of the singular extension strategy 
used by Deep Thought was an important advance in a setting where similar 
discoveries have already been made and can be readily implemented. Second, a 
straightforward way of extending searches is to use faster machines. The positive 
heuristic of the search programme is well-positioned to exploit the advances in 
speed made possible by microchip technology. Deep Thought capitalizes precisely 
on improved search strategies and increased speed. Fig. 2 shows graphically the 
rough structure of the heuristic search programme. Naturally, it is not intended to 
be exhaustive, and one might quibble about the exact assignment of elements to 
hard core or positive heuristic. Interestingly, although he charges AI with being 
degenerating, Dreyfus himself provides no such Lakatosian analysis of AI 
research programmes. 
On the other hand, the emulationist programme is not well-positioned to 
exploit recent hardware advances. Increased speed and memory size of computers 
cannot benefit a knowledge-based approach if the basic knowledge required is not 
forthcoming. One of the remaining impediments to the emulationist programme is 
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Fig. 2. Heuristic search programme. 
that we still do not understand adequately the knowledge that humans use to play 
chess, much less how to effectively implement this knowledge in a working 
program. 
Given the current state of the art, we do not see how Dreyfus’ claim that AI is 
a degenerating programme is justified. Indeed, we venture the modest prediction 
that research approaches that are able to exploit forthcoming advances in 
computer hardware, such as increased speed, will continue to show progress. 
4. General lessons 
4.1. What chess reveals 
Dreyfus might argue that the study of computer chess has little to tell us about 
more general issues in artificial intelligence. After all, Deep Thought plays chess 
well, but that is all that it does. Even on a hardware level, the machine is 
specifically tailored to play chess, and such narrow specialization may seem 
unlikely to illuminate other areas of cognitive performance. What have proved to 
be avenues of success in chess may not be as promising in other areas. Indeed, 
even should Deep Thought become word champion, Dreyfus might argue that 
chess is simply an exceptional case. While the fairly structured environment of 
chess produces problems that may be solved by heuristic search, general 
intelligence still requires the peculiarly holistic means of knowing that he reserves 
to humans. 
These cioncerns are well-taken: caution must be exercised in drawing general 
lessons from the success of computer chess. It is true, for instance, that the 
lessons learned in developing Deep Thought do not translate directly into such 
areas as natural language understanding, visual perception, machine learning, etc. 
However, this is 
immediately. The 
more indirect. 
The attempt to 
to look for applications in the wrong direction, and too 
general lessons to be drawn from computer chess are rather 
program computers to play chess reveals aspects of machine 
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intelligence in ways similar to how the study of human chess reveals aspects of 
organic intelligence. For instance, it is also true of human chess skill that it does 
not generalize well to other areas of cognition. Human chess masters do not tend 
to be better poets, architects, scientists, or mathematicians. They do not tend to 
be more intelligent than average, nor have any generally superior cognitive skills 
(with the possible exception of certain spatial recognition skills). However, one 
does not study how humans play chess in order to train better poets, architects, 
scientists, or mathematicians. Rather, such studies indicate how more fundamen- 
tal human cognitive abilities-such as search strategies, memory capacity and 
organization, pattern recognition abilities, etc.-are deployed in solving prob- 
lems. In a similar way, programming computers for chess helps reveal ways that 
the abilities of computers can be successfully combined and deployed in problem 
solving domains. 
4.2. Deep Thought versus Dreyfus 
The success of Deep Thought cuts against Dreyfus in particular ways. Dreyfus 
argues that even though, in principle, a successful chess strategy can be explicitly 
defined, in practice, the huge number of possible moves available overwhelms the 
“counting out” strategies that are available to computers. What is necessary for 
expert performance is the sort of “zeroing in” that he describes, which depends 
upon the fringe consciousness, ambiguity tolerance, essential vs. inessential 
discrimination, and perspicuous grouping that belong uniquely to human beings 
and which allow them to avoid the exhaustive search employed by computers [pp. 
120-1281. 
In the new introduction to What Computers Still Can’t Do, Dreyfus says, 
In the first edition of this book I noted that good chess players don’t seem to 
figure out from scratch what to do each time they make a move. Instead, they 
zero in on a certain aspect of the current position and figure out what to do 
from there [p. xxviii]. 
However, Deep Thought is at least a “good” player, yet it essentially does figure 
out from scratch what to do each time, without “zeroing in”‘. Whatever role they 
play in human expert performance, Deep Thought’s expert performance does not 
depend on the sort of holistic abilities Dreyfus attributes to people. 
Nor should we think that, for Dreyfus, chess is an isolated case. For example, 
his brother, Stuart Dreyfus addresses the general problems of dealing with 
“unstructured” domains: 
What are the first principles of recognizing faces? What are the first principles 
of driving? What are the first principles of recognizing positions in chess? 
What are the first principle of business? Those are subjects where there are 
no first principles: areas which are not structured, the kind of area where you 
can not use a scientific logical fact-based approach. In areas which do not 
admit to that, then my claim is that intuition is necessary for the highest level 
of performance [7, p. 751. 
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Given these claims, the success of Deep Thought can be interpreted in two ways. 
Either (1) it has uncovered hitherto undiscovered “first principles” of chess 
(leaving open the possibility of discovering such principles for other domains), or 
(2) it has, succeeded in producing expert-level performance in a genuinely 
“unstructured” domain. Either way, the necessity of Dreyfus’ brand of intuition is 
called seriously into question. 
Deep Thought also serves as a cautionary tale about attempting to model too 
closely, in computers, nature’s solutions to cognitive problems. As Daniel 
Dennett points out in his article “Cognitive Wheels”, with one microscopic 
exception, nature has never developed the wheel-yet it is the ubiquitous 
component that serves in artificial stead for all the walking, crawling, flapping, 
hopping, slithering modes of locomotion developed by nature [4]. By the same 
token, we should not be too surprised that the artificial intelligence solutions to 
cognitive problems are different from nature’s solutions. 
Finally, Dreyfus’ preoccupation with “phenomenological” analysis blinkers him 
to anything but the human case and misleadingly reveals computer limitations 
without uncovering their strengths. One might expect similar types of difficulties 
in designing a jetliner that flies the way a bird does, i.e., by flapping its wings. 
Such a design approach does not appropriately exploit the materials it has 
available. For instance, the alloy that would quickly fracture if made to flap 
functions Iperfectly well as an air foil. In a similar way, artificial intelligence 
approaches must exploit the materials and methods available to them, even if this 
means sacrificing what Dreyfus calls the phenomenology of intelligence. 
Insisting that artificial intelligence systems must preserve a particular phe- 
nomenological “feel” is reminiscent of the story of a man who buys a suit from a 
cut-rate tailor. The suit does not fit well, but the tailor insists that the fault is 
really with the customer’s bad posture. The tailor assures the customer that if he 
simply pulls in his arm, turns his leg, and raises his left shoulder, the suit will look 
fine. Skeptical, but in a hurry, the customer shuffles out the door and down the 
street. He is passed by two other men, who whisper, 
“Isn’t that a sad case of deformity?” 
“Yes--but didn’t the suit fit nice?” 
5. Implementation: holograms, connectionism, and paradigms 
5.1. The importance of implementation 
Questions of implementation play a crucial role in artificial intelligence 
research. What makes this research simultaneously intriguing and frustrating is the 
degree of explicit detail required to design and run a sophisticated computer 
program. Theoretical ambiguities must be resolved, gaps bridged, and specula- 
tions cashed out in ways not strictly required in many other disciplines. Even in 
physics, an. incomplete or ambiguous theory does not cause the physical world to 
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come crashing to a halt. Yet, an AI program may not even operate because of 
neglected presuppositions so simple that they are usually taken for granted. 
Against the critic’s taunt that computers can only do what they are told, the AI 
programmer’s frequent lament is that typically they won’t do even that. 
On the other hand, precisely because of this required rigor, when an AI 
program performs as it is intended, it offers a potential for theoretical confirma- 
tion not typically available otherwise, especially in fields such as cognitive 
psychology and philosophy of mind. Even if the task executed by the program is 
fairly simple, it offers an existence proof that the task can be accomplished 
incorporating the underlying assumptions of the program. If it is true that God is 
in the details, then for artificial intelligence, mind is in the implementation. 
Part of the reason for the importance of implementation is that artificial 
intelligence research attempts to model complex systems, i.e., minds. Electronic 
computers are crucial to this research because, for the first time, they allow the 
realization of models that at least approach the required complexity. On the other 
hand, disciplines like physics, for instance, have often been able to make 
important progress with relatively simple models (although here, too, computers 
are playing an increased role, as in the modelling of chaotic systems). A useful 
way of thinking of these AI computer models is as probes that help characterize a 
space of possible cognitive systems. Deep Thought, for instance, helps illuminate 
the extent to which search may be traded for knowledge. 
The particular significance of Deep Thought is that it demonstrates that the 
symbolic, explicit, “counting out” strategies that Dreyfus has characterized as 
hopeless can actually produce expert-level performance. Traditional AI has risen 
to the challenge offered by Dreyfus. The ball, so to speak, is now in his court. 
How well can he respond? 
Dreyfus espouses a sort of holism in which, for example, pattern matching and 
category membership are determined by the degree of resemblance between a 
situation and a concrete, representative paradigm. Although he does not doubt 
that “an artificial nervous system sufficiently like the human one, with other 
features such as sense organs and a body, would be intelligent” [p. 771, he does 
not think that digital computers, as used by traditional AI, are capable of the 
requisite holistic processes. Other types of systems, such as holograms or 
connectionist networks, seem more promising. 
However, we think that the promise for Dreyfus’ brand of holism is limited. As 
we point out below, holograms and connectionist networks do not work in quite 
the holistic way required by Dreyfus. Further, we will argue that the kind of 
resemblance that must be determined for pattern matching and determining 
category membership is not a holistic relationship. 
5.2. Holograms and paradigms 
On the level of actual implementation, it is not clear whether Dreyfus has an 
alternative to offer to that of traditional AI at all. He candidly admits that he does 
not know how the brain accomplishes much of what it does, but he is convinced 
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that it is not by symbolic information processing. He argues, for instance, that 
four uniquely human ways of knowing-(l) fringe consciousness, (2) ambiguity 
tolerance, (3) essential versus inessential discrimination, and (4) perspicuous 
grouping--are holistic, requiring fluid, open-ended, implicit capabilities that 
employ neither rules nor decomposable features. Such capabilities are at odds 
with the supposedly rigid, rule-bound, explicit requirements of digital computers 
[pp. loo-1281. 
However, Dreyfus is sensitive to the fact that serious rivals to the symbol- 
processing approach, especially on the nuts and bolts level, are few and far 
between. Although it may seem clear to Dreyfus that the brain somehow works 
differently from a computer, the challenge from his symbol-processing opponents, 
reinforced by their hardware implementations, has been to give some indication 
of just how. 
In the past, part of Dreyfus’ response to this challenge has been to invoke 
holograms. Indeed, in the book Mind over Machine, which he co-authored with 
his brother Stuart [6], he goes into some detail about how a hologram can exhibit 
mind-like properties. It is true that Dreyfus need not argue that the mind is 
literally like an optical hologram. However, we will examine this account carefully 
in order to characterize those crucial aspects of mind that Dreyfus thinks can be 
captured in a way similar to the operations of a holographically-based system. 
This will also help us characterize those aspects of connectionist systems that he 
finds attractive. 
If light from a hologram of a page of print is superimposed on light from a 
hologram of a particular character of print from the page, bright spots will appear 
in locations corresponding to the locations of similar characters on the page. 
Further, the brightness is proportional to the degree of match so that ill-formed or 
slightly rotated characters produce somewhat dimmer spots. What Dreyfus finds 
so intriguing about this is that, 
. . . the process makes no use of features. According to the information 
processing assumption, a letter F would be recognized by noting that it has 
one vertical line and two horizontal lines that intersect but do not cross the 
vertical, or some other such set of objective features. But in a holographic 
similarity recognition device two whole wave fronts interact, and the bright 
spots indicate peaks of energy or resonance. In recognizing similarities that 
way, the question “similar with respect to what” does not arise. [6, p. 601 
At first glance such a system seems to exhibit many of the capabilities Dreyfus 
claims for human beings, at least for pattern recognition problems. It is relatively 
flexible, responding to a greater or lesser extent depending upon how closely a 
given letler resembles a paradigm case of the letter. Further, according to 
Dreyfus, it accords more closely to the general way in which humans represent 
categories He claims, 
. . . that human beings are not aware of classifying objects as instances of 
abstract rules but rather group objects as more or less distant from an 
imagined paradigm. [p. 231 
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Quoting Eleanor Rosch, he continues, 
“Many experiments have shown that categories appear to be coded in the 
mind neither by means of lists of each individual member of the category, nor 
by means of a list of normal criteria, but, rather, in terms of a prototype of a 
typical category member. The most cognitively economical code for a 
category is, in fact, a concrete image of an average category member.” One 
paradigm, it seems, is worth a thousand rules. [p. 241 
There are versions of connectionist networks that can be implemented in a way 
that incorporates many of the essential characteristics that Dreyfus finds attractive 
in a holographically-based recognition system. For instance, a multi-layer con- 
nectionist network whose inputs are arranged into a two-dimensional visual array, 
and whose output units correspond to the 26 letters of the English alphabet, can 
be trained to respond appropriately when presented with examples of individual 
letters. The representations of such a network can be distributed throughout the 
units so that no individual unit or isolable group of units (except the output units) 
corresponds to a single letter type. Like a holographically-based system, such a 
network is fairly flexible, responding to a greater or lesser extent depending upon 
how closely a given letter resembles a paradigm case of the letter. 
The importance of these considerations to Dreyfus’ case is not the extent to 
which the brain literally resembles a hologram, or even a connectionist network. 
It is rather as an existence proof that mind-like capabilities such as pattern 
recognition may be accomplished without resorting to symbol-processing meth- 
ods. Unfortunately for Dreyfus, neither of these proposed implementations works 
in exactly the way he requires. 
To begin, Dreyfus is wrong when he says that the question of “similar with 
respect to what” simply does not arise in the case of holographic recognition. In 
fact, holographically-matched characters are similar with respect to overall shape 
and geometry, and such a basis of comparison simply does not properly categorize 
many characters. For instance, in terms of overall shape and geometry, the five 
characters outlined in Fig. 3 are more similar to one another than they are to any 
other surrounding characters, yet the four characters on the top row are each 
distinct letters. 
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Fig. 3. 
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Dreyfus, might argue that the shortcoming lies in comparing the characters to 
one anothler rather than to an appropriate paradigm. Given a genuinely repre- 
sentative paradigm as a proper basis of comparison, a holographic recognition 
system might be more successful in classifying the characters as particular letters. 
However, it is not clear that representatives of even familiar categories cluster 
around a concrete paradigm. For instance, Fig. 4, taken from Douglas Hofstad- 
ter, shows a wide variety of font types for the letter A [S, p. 2431. If Dreyfus is 
right, there should be a paradigmatic A, similarity to which defines membership 
in the category. The difficulty is in trying to find or characterize such a paradigm. 
Suppose one were to pick one of the characters in Fig. 4 (it does not matter 
which) as the paradigmatic example, and then attempt to order all the other 
examples in terms of their decreasing similarity to the paradigm. What quickly 
emerges is that there is no unique, unambiguous way of producing this order. In 
many cases it will simply be unclear the relative degree to which two different 
characters, resemble the paradigm. The reason for this, of course, is that the 
required measure of resemblance in the above task is underspecified. Any two 
Fig. 4. By permission of Letraset, a division of Esselte Corporation, and Douglas Hofstadter (see [8, 
p. 2431). 
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letters in Fig. 4 may be similar or dissimilar to each other in a large number of 
different ways. Their measure of resemblance depends on the chosen bases of 
comparison-and there’s the rub. Given the many distinct ways that similarity 
may be measured, it seems unlikely that a single, concrete paradigm could 
capture all of them. 
The determination of category membership by similarity to a concrete paradigm 
becomes particularly problematic when the category is abstract. For example, 
guitar strings, clock pendulums, and radio tuners are all instances of harmonic 
oscillators that are readily recognized as such by physicists. However, they are not 
obviously similar, at least in terms of conformity to a concrete paradigm. The 
similarities among them are subtle, abstract, and symbolic, involving such 
concepts as energy potential, restoring force, equilibrium point, etc. Nor is it the 
case that these underlying concepts are themselves represented by concrete 
paradigms. For example, the restoring force in a plucked guitar string and in a 
swinging clock pendulum seem quite distinct. Neither seems to function as a 
paradigm for the other, nor do they seem like variations on a single, underlying 
concrete paradigm. 
Now, to return these considerations to the case of chess, it seems unlikely that 
meaningful chess patterns are represented by similarity to a concrete paradigm. 
For instance, chess concepts like attacking and pinning relationships, to be of 
generalizable use, must be characterized independently of particular pieces or 
particular positions on the board. Dreyfus himself points out the open-endedness 
of chess patterns when he says, 
. . . similarity cannot be defined as having a large number of pieces on 
identical squares. Two positions which are identical except for one pawn 
moved to an adjacent square can be totally different, while two positions can 
be similar although no pieces are on the same square in each [p. 311. 
We agree-but this is precisely the reason it remains unclear why Dreyfus 
thinks that appropriate patterns can be determined by comparison to a concrete 
paradigm. Indeed, it seems not so much that Dreyfus has an implementational 
problem, but a conceptual one. Specifying “similar with respect to what” seems 
essential in any even mildly complex comparison. 
5.3. Schematic and symbolic alternatives 
For all but the simplest patterns, appropriate representations eem to require 
some sort of schematic structure. For instance, in a discussion of letter types, 
which generalizes to other sorts of patterns, Douglas Hofstadter suggests that, 
. . . any concrete letterform is composed of conceptual roles rather than 
geometric parts. . . . A role . . . does not have a fixed set of parameters . . . 
but it has instead a set of tests or criteria to be applied to candidates that 
might be instances of it. . . . (N)ot all tests have to be passed; not all criteria 
have to be present. Instead, the candidate receives a score computed from 
the tests and criteria. [8, pp. 279-2801 
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A candidate with a sufficiently high score is accepted as a member of a given 
category, one with a mid-range score is accepted tentatively, but one with a 
sufficiently low score is rejected. But what are roles? Hofstadter says, 
An example of such a role is that of “crossbar”. Note that I am not saying 
“crossbar in capital ‘A”,’ but merely “crossbar”. Roles are modular; they 
jump across letter boundaries. [8, p. 2801 
Although elements are specified for each letter, elements may differ systematical- 
ly from font type to font type. Therefore, each concrete font type must further 
specify a description of the way the elements are “filled out,” but the overall 
category schematic need not be so specific. 
Hofstadter’s discussion parallels the treatment by Holland et al., regarding 
default hierarchies [9]. A default hierarchy is a cluster of rules containing default 
expectations about members of a certain category, plus exception rules; e.g., “If 
X is a bird, then X can fly” is a default expectation, while “If X is a bird with 
small wings and a large body, then X cannot fly” is an exception rule [9, p. 1821. 
Like Hofistadter’s roles, no criterion is essential. Further, 
One implication of our view is that it is not necessary to assume that an 
explicit category prototype, in the sense of an ideal example constructed by 
averaging presented instances, is either necessary or sufficient to represent all 
that is induced about category structure. [9, pp. 182-1831 
Rather, categories are represented by clusters of rules or characteristics. A 
particular prototype (or paradigm, to use our previous language) can sometimes 
be constructed from such rules, if they are specific enough. However, the rules 
may be sufficiently general that they do not converge on a single instance or 
prototype.. 
Thus arises the difficulty in attempting to find a single paradigm of A in Fig. 4. 
The rules that define the ways in which elements may fill certain roles in the 
structure of the letters is relatively open-ended. This means that there is no single 
instance of A that meets the criteria defined by the rules better than all others. 
What we seem to find, rather, is sets of criss-crossing relationships that members 
of a category have in common to a greater of lesser extent, but none of which is 
singularly necessary or sufficient. There is an echo in all this of Wittgenstein’s 
family resemblance argument. 
5.4. Wit&enstein , paradigms, and family resemblance 
In What Computers Still Can’t Do, Dreyfus quotes Wittgenstein on the doctrine 
of family resemblance: 
“We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
Sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
“fam.ily resemblances”, . for the various resemblances between members of a 
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family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc., overlap 
and criss-cross in the same way. . . . We extend our concept . . . as in spinning 
a thread we twist fiber on fiber.” [p. 1261, [15, p. 321 
Dreyfus continues that, 
Since this sort of recognition of a member of a “family” is accomplished not 
by a list of traits, but by seeing the case in question in terms of its proximity 
to a paradigm (i.e., typical) case, such recognition gives us another kind of 
openness and flexibility. [p. 1261 
However, in his haste to enlist Wittgenstein, Dreyfus has missed some crucial 
points. The first in that, in a family group, there need not be a “typical” member 
at all. Not only can there be members of the group that have no traits in common, 
there need not be even a member that has a particularly large numbers of traits 
found throughout the group. Given the discontinuous way that family resem- 
blances are generated, there may simply be no way to produce a concrete 
paradigm that is fairly representative of the entire family group. 
Secondly, family resemblances are built up from individual similarities between 
individual members of the family group. That is, while “similar with respect to 
what” cannot be answered for the entire family group, it can be answered for 
similarities between individual members. For instance, two members may have 
the same hair, while two others have the same eyes, etc. 
Contrary to Dreyfus, it seems that an appropriate symbolic structure might be 
useful for representing such relationships. As Dreyfus points out, “Everything is 
similar to everything else in an indefinitely large number of ways” [p. xxvi]. Why, 
then do we make some comparisons rather than others-r, in Dreyfus’ terms, 
what are the “constraints on similarity” [p. xxvi]? 
A plausible answer is that they are something like the role-filling schematics 
described by Hofstadter. For instance, imagine human family resemblance 
characterized by a frame structure with slots labelled “eyes: shape, color; hair: 
color, texture; gait; body build; etc.” The slots may be instantiated by characteris- 
tics of particular individuals. Family resemblance is determined by noting 
resemblances within slotted categories among individuals. 
Such a scheme is fairly open-ended, permitting new but non-identical in- 
dividuals to be properly categorized, yet constraining the kinds of similarities 
considered. For instance, “composed of cells” and “attracted by a gravitational 
field”, while both true, are excluded from the family resemblance frame and are 
not considered. 
Of course, it’s true that much work remains to be done on just what the proper 
bases of comparison should be. What does seem clear, however, is that com- 
parison to a concrete paradigm is not an adequate basis for the sorts of 
comparisons and categorizations we have been considering in this paper. 
The schematic structures suggested by Hofstadter also seem appropriate for 
representing abstract categories such as the harmonic oscillators mentioned 
above. The roles of energy potential, restoring force, equilibrium point, etc., may 
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be filled out appropriately for concrete examples, yet the schematic of the 
representation itself need not include the concrete instances. Similarly, chess 
patterns may be represented schematically. Such concepts as pinned and protect- 
ing pieces, forks, attacks, control of central squares, etc., may be represented as 
roles that can be instantiated in a variety of ways. 
This is not say that traditional AI has solved all the problems involved in 
category representation. It certainly has not, and much work remains to be done. 
However, traditional AI at least has implementational means of enacting its 
representational principles, such as frame and slot structures coupled with default 
hierarchies. On the other hand, it is not clear that Dreyfus can show a working 
implementation of a system that measures similarity to a paradigm in the way he 
seems to require. 
6. Conchsion: is Dreyfus a degenerating programme? 
In the end, what is likely to be Dreyfus’ influence on the field of artificial 
intelligence? Although Dreyfus himself is not an AI researcher, there has been a 
fair amount of research done that is at least compatible with many of his essential 
views-enough to construct at least an outline of a research programme. In this 
sense, Dlreyfus may be said to have an alternative research programme. The 
question is whether it is a progressive or degenerating one. 
We put the question of Dreyfus’ influence to several influential workers in AI. 
The answers were, to say the least, mixed, some of them extreme. For instance, 
David Israel told us that he had not been influenced by Dreyfus at all, and knew 
of no researcher who had. On the other hand, Terry Winograd told us that he 
thought virtually everyone had been influenced by Dreyfus to some degree. More 
moderately, Bill Clancy said that he had been indirectly influenced by Dreyfus 
through ‘Winograd, but that any influence by Dreyfus had to be placed within the 
context of previous influence by Ryle, Polyani, Garfinkel, and Wittgenstein. 
Marvin Minsky rated Dreyfus’ influence at “about a 2 or 3” on a scale of 10. 
Citing the general usefulness of critics, Minsky allowed that, compared with some 
other critics, at least Dreyfus was clear. On the other hand, John McCarthy 
thought that Dreyfus was too vague to offer any useful guidance. Perhaps the 
most balanced comment was pointed out to us by Daniel Dennett, who allowed 
that Dreyfus’ influence was significant, because his criticisms had been generally 
on the mark-but perhaps in areas where AI researchers were already discovering 
the important problems on their own [5]. 
Our own assessment is that Dreyfus’ influence has been modest and is 
diminishing. The success of Deep Thought undercuts Dreyfus’ analysis of the 
necessary conditions for intelligence-and even though the introductions to the 
book have been getting longer, the list of things that computers can’t do has 
actually ‘been getting shorter. 
Finally, one of the more disturbing aspects of this new edition of What 
Computers Still Can’t Do is that there is virtually no new material. That Dreyfus 
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believes twenty years of research can be addressed in a 50-page introduction is 
disturbing-that he has new examples but essentially no new arguments is 
disappointing. That so much of this book stands unaltered, despite the intervening 
years of research, leads us to wonder whether it is not Dreyfus’ criticism that is 
degenerating. 
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